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Optimism and pessimism play a crucial role in decision–making under risk. Ex-
pected utility theory is the dominant theory to analyze decision–making under risk.
However, it can not express optimism and pessimism. The widely used alternative
to expected utility theory is rank dependent utility theory introduced by Quiggin
(1981, 1982), and it can express optimism and pessimism. This note gives a simple,
but useful characterization of optimism and pessimism represented by a convex and
concave shift of probability weighting functions, and presents its comparative static
applications.
In this note, optimism and pessimism are characterized by monotone likelihood
ratio dominance between their corresponding risk–neutral decision weights. This
characterization is expected to be useful for comparative static analysis in the fol-
lowing reasons. It is known that this characterization is useful to obtain sharp
comparative static results in expected utility theory, e.g. Osaki (2005), Ohnishi and
Osaki (2006a) and others.1) As in Quiggin (1991), rank dependent expected utility
can be regarded as “expected utility with respect to a transformed probability distri-
bution”. This observation suggests that we can also obtain them in rank dependent
expected utility theory. Also, monotone likelihood ratio dominance is deﬁned as
log–supermodularity between compared probability density functions. It plays an
important role in comparative static analysis under risk (Athey, 2002; Jewitt, 1987).
This note is related to previous studies about comparative static analysis in gen-
eralized expected utility theory including rank dependent expected utility theory.
1)Ohnishi and Osaki (2006b) extended this characterization to nonexpected utility theory ap-
plying the property of log–supermodularity.
1Quiggin (1991, 1995) determined conditions to preserve comparative static results
in expected utility theory to those in rank dependent expected utility theory. Schlee
(1994) claimed that monotone likelihood ratio dominance may not have the compar-
ative static prediction under the generalized expected utility theory. The concern
of these papers is the preservation of comparative static results from expected util-
ity theory to rank dependent expected utility theory. In contrast, our concern is
how shifts in probability weighting function representing optimism and pessimism
inﬂuence economic behavior under risk.
The organization of our note is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy gives some prelimi-
naries and provides a risk–neutral characterization of optimism and pessimism. In
Section 3, we obtain two comparative static predictions applying the characteriza-
tion in Section 2. Section 4 is a conclusion.
2 A risk–neutral characterization of optimism and
pessimism
First of all, we give a representation of Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU),
a preference relation deﬁned over discrete random variables. A discrete random
variable is an outcome vector x = (x1;x2;:::;xS) with a corresponding probability
vector p = (p1;p2;:::;pS). The probability is strictly positive, ps > 0 and sum to
one,
PS
s=1 ps = 1. Without loss of any generality, we assume that the outcomes are
ranked in ascending order, x1 < x2 < ::: < xS. A Decision Maker (DM) has RDEU















S) is a decision weight vector with respect to a Probability




s = q(p1 + p2 + ::: + ps) ¡ q(p1 + p2 + ::: + ps¡1); (2)
and d
q
1 = q(p1). For notational ease, the cumulative probability is denoted as Pt =
Pt
s=1 ps. The probability weighting function q is increasing in P with q(0) = 0
and q(1) = 1. Expected utility representation corresponds to the linear PWF,
q(P) = P. The utility function u is increasing in x. We note that concavity of the
utility function is not necessary for our analysis. Outcomes are ranked in ascending
order in our analysis, on the other hand, other many researches represent that they
are ranked in descending order, x1 > x2 > ::: > xS. We can present an identical
analysis in both outcome representations because of the duality of corresponding
PWFs (Diecidue and Wakker; 2001).
To characterize optimism and pessimism, we deﬁne two notions. First, we deﬁne











It is clear that the risk–neutral decision weight is also the probability of outcome
xs, since it is strictly positive, ˆ dq
s > 0, and sums to one,
PS
s=1 ˆ dq
s = 1. Next, we give
a deﬁnition of “more optimistic” (“more pessimistic”) as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.1. A probability weighting function q is more optimistic (pessimistic)
3than r if there exists an increasing and convex (concave) function Á such that q =
Á ± r.
We give a couple of explanations about optimism and pessimism. First, more
optimistic (pessimistic) PWFs underweight (overweight) the cumulative probability
of worse outcomes, q(P) · (¸) r(P) for all P. Second, pessimistic PWFs character-
ize the strong risk aversion, aversion to mean–preserving increase in risk (Rothschild
and Stiglitz; 1970). This characterization was ﬁrst demonstrated by Chew, Karni
and Safra (1987). In a recent paper, Ryan (2006) obtained it under weaker condi-
tions and also displayed a nice summary of risk aversion in RDEU.
Next, we deﬁne a stochastic dominance characterizing optimism and pessimism:







S). The probability vector p2 dominates p1 in the sense of mono-











for all s < t.
Monotone Likelihood Ratio Dominance (MLRD) is a stronger stochastic dom-
inance than First–order Stochastic Dominance (FSD). The proof is in standard
references of stochastic dominance e.g. Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994), M¨ uller
and Stoyan (2002) and others.
Theorem 2.1. A probability weighting function q is more optimistic (pessimistic)
than r, if and only if the corresponding risk–neutral decision weight vector ˆ d
q
with
respect to the probability weighting function q dominates (is dominated by) ˆ d
r
in
the sense of monotone likelihood ratio dominance.
4Proof. We only give the proof of the optimistic case, since the pessimistic case is































We deﬁne Rs := r(Ps). By noting that Rs · Rt for all s · t because of r



















s by the deﬁnition of the decision weight.
Combining the above two discussions, we complete the proof.
Since the identical PWF corresponds to the expected utility, we have the fol-
lowing corollary: a risk–neutral decision weight with respect to a convex (concave)
probability weighting function dominates (is dominated by) that for the expected
utility decision–maker. Quiggin (1995) pointed out that a convex (concave) PWF
dominates (is dominated by) the original distribution function in the sense of MLRD.
This is essentially the second part of the proof. This claim suggests that compar-
ative static analysis of MLRD changes in the expected utility theory can also be
applied to those of the shift to a more optimistic (pessimistic) PWF in RDEU.
53 Applications
In this section, we give two comparative static results applying Theorem 2.1. First,
we demonstrate that more optimistic (pessimistic) representative investors lead to
icreases (decreases) in equilibrium asset prices. Second, we display that more op-
timistic (pessimistic) decision makers behave in a more risk–tolerant (risk–averse)
manner under background risk when utility functions exhibit decreasing absolute
risk aversion.
3.1 Asset price
We consider a static version of Lucas (1978), a two–date pure exchange economy
with a representative investor. The representative investor has the RDEU with a
PWF q and an increasing utility function u. There are two assets traded in the
asset market, risk–free and risky assets. The risk–free asset is the numeraire, and
its (gross) return can be normalized to one, without loss of any generality. The
return of the risky asset is a discrete random variable (p1;x1;p2;x2;:::;pS;xS), and
its price is ¼q. The endowment consists of w units of the risk–free asset and one
unit of the risky asset. The investor determines the investment in the two assets to
maximize the RDEU from the ﬁnal wealth. The investments of the risk–free and









s.t. ® + ¯¼
q · w + ¼
q:
(8)
The existence of the representative investor means no–trade equilibrium occurs,
that is, the demands in the equilibrium are initial wealth. Under some regularity











We demonstrate the eﬀect of optimism (pessimism) on asset prices applying






































In a word, the equilibrium asset price is equal to the expectation of the discrete









S). We consider a more pessimistic (optimistic) PWF r than q. By
Theorem 2.1, the risk–neutral decision weight ˆ d
q
dominates (is dominated by) ˆ d
r
in














We summarize the discussion into the following result:
Result 3.1. More optimistic (pessimistic) representative investors lead to icreases
(decreases) in equilibrium asset prices.
3.2 Comparative risk aversion under background risk
We consider a DM with the RDEU representation facing both controllable and
uncontrollable risks, which are mutually independent random variables. The uncon-
7trollable risk is usually called background risk. The RDEU is exhibited by a PWF q
and an increasing utility function u. A realization of the controllable risk is x. And
the background risk is represented by a discrete random variable ² = (²1;²2;:::;²S)
with a probability vector p = (p1;p2;:::;pS). We determine the eﬀect of optimism
(pessimism) on Arrow–Pratt (absolute) risk aversion under background risk (Arrow;
1971, Pratt; 1964).






su(x + ²s): (13)
















00(x + ²s): (15)























































8In a word, Arrow–Pratt risk aversion under background risk is equal to the expecta-









S). We assume that the utility function exhibits decreasing
absolute risk aversion and consider a more pessimistic (optimistic) PWF r than q.











sA(x + ²s) = A(x;v;r): (19)
We summarize the discussion into the following result:
Result 3.2. Suppose that utility functions display decreasing absolute risk aversion.
More optimistic (pessimistic) decision makers behave in a more risk–tolerant (risk–
averse) manner under background risk.
4 Conclusion
Optimism and pessimism inﬂuence most decision–makings under risk. Rank depen-
dent expected utility theory can express them by the shape of probability weighting
functions. Convex and concave shift of the probability weighting function capture
them. It is not enough to express optimism and pessimism, but it is also impor-
tant to understand how they inﬂuence economic problems under risk. This is a
motivation of our new characterization of optimism and pessimism.
The characterization of optimism and pessimism is given as monotone likelihood
ratio dominance between their corresponding risk–neutral decision weights. This
characterization has sharp comparative static predictions for economic problems
under risk parallel to the expected utility theory. We display the following two
comparative static predictions. First, more optimistic (pessimistic) representative
9investors lead to increases (decreases) in asset prices, Second more optimistic (pes-
simistic) decision makers behave in a more risk–bear (risk–averse) manner under
background risk if they exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Finally, we give a comment on future research. Experimental evidences suggest
inverse S–shape probability weighting functions. However, our characterization does
not predict how this shape inﬂuence decision problems under risk compared to the
expected utility theory. This research remains to be completed.
10References
Arrow, K, J., 1971, Essays in the theory of risk bearing. (Markham
Publishing, Chicago).
Athey, S., 2002, Monotone comparative statics under uncertainty, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 117, 187–223.
Chew, S., Karni, E., Safra, Z., 1987, Risk aversion in the theory of ex-
pected utility with rank dependent probabilities, Journal of Economic
Theory 42, 370–381.
Diecidue, E., Wakker, P. P., 2001, On the intuition of rank–dependent
utility, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 23, 281–298.
Jewitt, I., 1987, Choosing between risky prospects: the characterization
of comparative statics results, Review of Economic Studies 54, 73–85.
Lucas, R., 1978, Asset prices in an exchange economy, Econometrica 46,
1429–1446.
M¨ uller, A., Stoyan, D., 2002, Comparative methods for stochastic models
and risks. (John Wiley & Sons, New York).
Nachman, D. C., 1982, Preservation of “more risk aversion” under ex-
pectations, Journal of Economic Theory 28, 361–368.
Ohnishi, M. and Osaki, Y., 2006a, Comparative risk aversion under back-
ground risks revisited, Discussion Paper, Osaka University.
Ohnishi, M. and Osaki, Y., 2006b, The comparative statics on asset
prices based on bull and bear market measure, European Journal of
Operational Research 168, 291–300.
Osaki, Y., 2005, Dependent background risks and asset prices, Economics
Bulletin 4(8), 1–8.
Pratt, J. W., 1964, Risk aversion in the small and in the large, Econo-
metrica 32, 122–136.
Quiggin, J., 1981, Risk perception and risk aversion among australian
farmers, Australian Journal of Agricultual Economics 25, 160–169.
Quiggin, J., 1982, A theory of anticipated utility, Journal of Economic
Behabiour and Organization 3, 323–343.
Quiggin, J., 1991, Comparative statics for rank–dependent expected util-
ity theory, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 4, 339–350.
11Quiggin, J., 1995, Economic choice in generalized expected utility theory,
Theory and Decision 38, 153–171.
Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J., 1970, Increasing risk I: A deﬁnition, Journal
of Economic Theory 2, 225–243.
Ryan, M. J., 2006, Risk aversion in RDEU, Journal of Mathematical
Economics 42, 675–697.
Schlee, E. E., 1994, The preservation of multivariate comparative statics
in nonexpected utility theory, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 9,
257–272.
Shaked, M., Shanthikumar, G. J., 1994, Stochastic orders and their ap-
plications. (Academic Press, Boston).
12